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Abstract—IP spoofing remains a problem today in the Internet.
In this paper, a new system called Inter-Domain Routing Valida-
tor Based Spoofing Defence System (SDS) for filtering spoofed IP
packets is proposed . SDS uses efficient symmetric key message
authentication code (UMAC) as its tag to verify that a source IP
address is valid. Different ASes border routers obtain a shared
key via the Inter-Domain Routing Validator (IRV) servers which
will manage the secret keys and exchange keys among different
ASes via security communication channel. SDS is efficient, secure
and easy to cooperate with other defence mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet Protocol (IP) [1] is the foundation of the Internet.
Packets sent using the IP protocol include the IP address of
the sending host. The recipient who replies to the sender
using this address is not verified by the protocol. The IP
protocol specifies no method for validating the authenticity
of the packet’s source. This implies that the attacker can forge
the source address. This is a well-known problem and has
been well described in [2]. Sending IP packets with forged
source address is known as IP Spoofing and could be used by
attackers for several purposes. IP spoofing remains a popular
method to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) at-
tacks [3] which cost millions of dollars to online companies.
Unfortunately, this attack is difficult to stop because hackers
are able to hide their IP address by IP Spoofing, so it is
often impossible to identify their location. On the other hand,
an attacker can access a sensitive computer or a network by
making it appear that a malicious message has come from a
trusted machine by spoofing the IP address of that machine.
Many solutions have been proposed to detect IP spoofing.
Most of them are based on filtering packets, based on the
IP source address and the incoming interface [4]. In this
paper, we present an alternative solution to the Inter-domain
Routing Validator (IRV) [5] based spoofing defence system
(SDS) which is a router based packet marking solution. Un-
fortunately, like any other router based solutions, the efficiency
of the system depends on the number of participating routers.
It is impossible that every router on the Internet participate
in the system and different Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
deploy the same method. Thus, the collaboration with different
systems is considered in our system. IRV is a new protocol
which acts as a companion to Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP) [6] and solves some BGP security issues, see more
details in [5].
The idea of SDS comes from packet marking system, such
as SPM, passport. Packet marking seems to be the most
efficient method to solve IP spoofing problem. Most of these
systems depend on BGP message e.g. BGP UPDATE message,
unfortunately, this is insecure. SDS based on secure BGP (IRV-
BGP) which is more secure than others.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In section II we
present a detailed description of the architecture of SDS and
it’s benefits. We conclude our work and present a future plan
in section III.
II. THE SPOOFING DEFENCE SYSTEM
The purpose of our system is to provide an authentic source
identifier which can be used by the network to identify the
spoofing packet. To enable the Spoofing Defence System
(SDS) some participating Autonomous Systems (ASes) are
required to mark the outgoing packets with keyed Message
Authentication Code, and verify the authenticity of the MAC
on incoming packets.
A. Overview
Our proposed system is essentially a packet marking system.
In the SDS architecture a MAC is added to each packet, to
validate that the packet is not spoofed. Figure 1 shows how
SDS works at a high level. When a packet leaves its source
AS, the border router (R) of AS stamps one MAC for next
AS on the path into its header. Each MAC is computed using
a secret key shared between each AS on the path. E.g. AS1
and AS2, AS2 and AS3...
When the packet enters the next AS on the path, the border
router verifies the MAC value using the secret key shared with
the previous AS. A correct MAC can only be produced by the
current AS which shared the secret key with the previous AS.
If the MAC verifies, it is sufficient to show that the packet
comes from the source AS indicated by its source address,
and the border router will generate a new MAC to overwrite
the valid one. The new secret key is shared between current AS
and next AS. Otherwise, it is a spoofed packet. The packet with
an invalid MAC is discarded at the current AS. We chose to
discard spoofed packets because that spoofed packets will not
further consume network resources, such as bandwidth. This
is an important feature of SDS, especially under DDoS attack.
Fig. 1. A high level overview of spoofing defence system
Thus, the spoofed packet will never reach the destination. The
MAC generation process only happens at the initial time, once
a communication is established between source and destination
then there is no requirement to generate a new MAC and share
a new secret key between ASes on the path. The MAC is
added into the packet by current border router, the next router
just compares the MAC value with the previous packet. The
time required to verify each packet and share the secret key
is saved.
The stamping and verification processes could also be
written as following steps:
Step 1: Border router of ASi computes MAC (src, dst, len,
IP ID, ASi num, ASi+1 num, payload[0,7]) using the secret
key shared between ASi and ASi+1. It then stamps MAC
into IP opinion field as part of IP header in the packet which
will be sent to the ASi+1. Note: The MAC is computed
only once (The MAC value never change in the same path),
the following packets are added to the same MAC in the IP
opinion field till communication finish.
Step 2: Border router of ASi+1 verifies the MAC in the IP
opinion field of the packet received from ASi.
-if the MAC value is correct, ASi+1 repeats step 1. The
border router will replace the MAC in the IP opinion field.
Then the new packet will be send to the next AS on the path.
Note: The first time verification needs to recompute the MAC
value. After that, the MAC value is only compared with the
first packet MAC value from the ASi till communication is
finished.
-else discard the packet: the source address must have been
spoofed.
B. Deployment and Implementation
The role of the keyed Message Authentication Code (MAC)
is to verify that the source address of a packet is not spoofed.
The IP layer is the largest common protocol of the Internet,
all Internet protocols run over it. Thus, adding the MAC to
the IP header allows SDS to capture any spoofing attack over
any Internet protocol, such as TCP, UDP or other protocols.
For the ease of deployment and implementation of SDS, the
MAC can be placed in the IP option field in the IP header.
Most of router-based systems use ID field in the IP header.
This obviously may lead to problems to cooperate with other
IP spoofing defence techniques like SPM [7] and StackPi [8].
Another disadvantage in using the IP ID field is that the IP
ID field length is only 16-bit, which is insecure under off-line
cryptanalysis attack. Thus, we use IP option field and MAC
in SDS to avoid these problems.
1) The Message Authentication Code(MAC): Obviously,
SDS can be implemented via digital signatures. A source
signs its packets, and routers validate the digital signatures
with the source’s public key. We discard this approach as
digital signatures are computationally expensive to generate
and verify. Instead, SDS uses an efficient symmetric key MAC
(UMAC) [9] as its signature. Our design uses UMAC because
of its high speed. UMAC takes a nonce as its input, so we
generate a random number into the 32-bit nonce field and
use it together with the 16-bit IP Identification to generate
a 48-bit nonce for UMAC computation. A border router of
an AS stamps a MAC for the next AS on the path to the
destination. Each MAC is computed using the key which is
128-bit, shares with the next AS on the path. These secret keys
are exchanged between ASes as described in subsection The
Key. The MAC computed for the next AS covers the source
address, the destination address, the IP ID, the packet length
field of the IP header, current and next AS number and the first
8 bytes of packet payload. In Figure 1, when a packet from
host A to host B leaves AS1 to AS2, the border router R2
of AS1 computes MAC2 (src, dst, len, IP ID, AS1 num, AS2
num, payload[0,7]). Figure 2 shows a possible SDS header
format used in our implementation. Our design uses a 64-bit
MAC for each AS hop. A border router stamps/replaces a SDS
header for a packet with a valid source address, and discards
the spoofed packet otherwise.
Fig. 2. Possible header format of spoofing defence system in IPv4 [1]
2) The key: Exchanging key information between routers is
required in our system. It is important in our system to make
sure that the key exchange is secure. Some IP spoofing defence
systems exchange secret keys on BGP, such as Passport [10],
this is obviously insecure due to various BGP security issues
such as prefix hijacking.
BGP has three major weaknesses [11]. The first weakness
is there is no mechanism to check the integrity, freshness and
source authenticity of BGP message. Second, BGP doesn’t
offer any mechanism to verify the authenticity of an address
prefix and an AS origination of this prefix in the routing
system. Last, the BGP protocol doesn’t provide any way to
guarantee that the attributes of a BGP UPDATE message
are correct. The lack of security concepts in BGP leaves it
vulnerable to several types of control plane attacks [12]. There
are several suggestions to secure BGP by adding certificate
keys to BGP announcements to validate them. In secure
BGP, there are two basic methods of keys distribution been
suggested and under consideration of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). The first one is the central method where
the organization of IP registries (ARIN, APNIC, RIPE) are
in charge of distributing the keys. The second one is the IRV
(Inter-domain Routing Validator) method that uses distributed
server (IRV) in each AS to manage the key distribution. We
use the second method the same as is to be used in SPM [7] to
distribute and manage the secret key. Note, the keys distributed
here are not the keys we used in SDS. Those distributed keys
are used for BGP authentication and verification, see more
details in [5].
We use one central server in each AS to manage the secret
key. IRV is a new architecture used to solve security issues
in BGP. That is, the IRV is used to validate BGP data and
acquire additional routing information relevant to an AS. IPSec
or TLS can be used to ensure the integrity and authenticity. We
assume that the security communication channel has already
been established before key exchange. In SDS, the IRV selects
and exchanges the secret key for different ASes border routers,
e.g. Figure 1 shows how the IRV exchanges the secret key via
IPSec for different ASes. We believe the IRV provides better
security in partial deployments, which is important for the
success of SDS. Consider the implementation of IRV, it must
be simple, robust, and built on widely deployed technology.
Obviously, HTTP easily fulfills these requirements, our system
implements IRV as a web-based service. Many well known
security solutions provide security to web-based services such
as SSL/TLS and IPSec. Hence, ASes are free to implement
IRV security as is appropriate for their environment.
3) Benefit of SDS: We use an efficient symmetric key
MAC (UMAC) [9] in SDS. The UMAC with 128-bit keys
is computationally infeasible to break. In spoofing attack, the
attacker might try to guess a valid SDS header by sending
packets. Because a SDS header has 64-bit MAC value, the
attacker have to send at lease 263 packets to guess the correct
one. The time that the attacker takes exceeds the period of
UMAC renew. It is obviously easy to cooperate with other
defence mechanisms such as SPM [7], because we use the IP
option field when most of them are using the IP ID field.
Key distributing is needed in IRV-BGP as we mentioned
in the previous section. The IRV system is a independent
system, i.e. it is possible to configure the routing system to
prevent malicious hosts from injecting routing packets. For
instance, two adjacent routers authorize each other before
they set up communication. When this kind of communication
is established, routers can then forward and process routing
packets with the highest priority. Normal data traffic cannot
congest the routing channel.
For better security, domains need to periodically change the
secret keys. This requires periodic update of new secret key
pairs, which can happen at a large time scale. SDS conjunction
with BGP UPDATE message to renew its secret key pairs.
Rapid rekeying prevents an attacker form replaying a SDS
packet.
III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a new approach to the IP
spoofing defence called Inter-Domain Routing Validator Based
Spoofing Defence System (SDS). The approach effectively
filters the spoofing packet. SDS is efficient, secure and easy to
cooperate with other defence mechanism. SDS uses efficient
symmetric key message authentication code (UMAC) as its
digital signature to verify that IP packet has not been spoofed.
Different ASes border routers obtain shared keys via IRV
servers which will manage the secret keys and exchange keys
between different ASes via security communication channel
such as using IPSec to establish the security communication
channel between IRV servers. SDS is deployable because the
computational cost for SDS header generation, validation and
key exchange is affordable.
Several issues of SDS were not discussed in this paper.
They will be investigated and reported in the near future.
In the future, we are planning to prove the deployment
performance of SDS using simulation studies. It would be
interesting to examine that real cooperate performance with
other defence mechanisms such as Ingress/engress filter, SPM
in the network.
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